Adaptation of NATO’s cyber defence policy (2014–2018)

Cyber threats and cyber attacks have become a reality in our daily routine as well as one of the main security policy concerns globally. State sponsored cyber-attacks can be a part of hybrid warfare, an instrument to achieve states’ geopolitical and economic goals. For these reasons, in recent years, cybersecurity has been on the agenda of many international organisations, including NATO. Crucial decisions have been taken, for instance, in 2014 NATO leaders agreed that a significant cyber-attack could invoke a collective response (Article 5) by NATO. Moreover, in 2016 Allies recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations. The objective of the article is to analyse how NATO’s cyber defence policy has shifted from 2014 to 2018 in the light of adaptation of the Alliance’s deterrence strategy. The author has put forward a hypothesis that NATO’s cyber defence posture has transformed from “deterrence by denial” into a strategy where “deterrence by denial” is augmented by “deterrence by punishment”, in response to Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea. Research results will explain the adaptive nature of NATO’s cyber defence policy in the context of developments in the conventional domain and illuminate the challenges faced by the cyber deterrence posture