Abstract
Latvia has been consistently named as among the bet-
ter-prepared European Union (EU) countries in countering
disinformation3 and, along with other Baltic states, even
called “inspirational” in this regard.4 Both the high level of
attention and the creative response toolkit employed by
Latvia are consequential: the Latvian information envi-
ronment functions as a hybrid battlespace, as the nation
has been at the centre of the overlap of authoritarian
information influence approaches for years.s for TTPs, Russia continues to run high-volume,
disruptive operations aimed at delegitimising democrat-
ic institutions, undermining NATO, harnessing existing
fissures and eroding public trust through persistent,
increasingly artificial intelligence (AI)-powered infor-
mation manipulation. This prioritises receptivity among
Latvia’s Russian-speaking population, but also banks on
the polarisation of the Latvian-speaking population along
political and values lines. Belarus’ approach is similar to
Russia’s, but lacks some of its capabilities. In contrast,
China pursues a low-volume, self-centred elite-driven
strategy that shapes narratives around global legitimacy,
economic interdependence and “win–win” multilateralism,
while engaging in information suppression.
ter-prepared European Union (EU) countries in countering
disinformation3 and, along with other Baltic states, even
called “inspirational” in this regard.4 Both the high level of
attention and the creative response toolkit employed by
Latvia are consequential: the Latvian information envi-
ronment functions as a hybrid battlespace, as the nation
has been at the centre of the overlap of authoritarian
information influence approaches for years.s for TTPs, Russia continues to run high-volume,
disruptive operations aimed at delegitimising democrat-
ic institutions, undermining NATO, harnessing existing
fissures and eroding public trust through persistent,
increasingly artificial intelligence (AI)-powered infor-
mation manipulation. This prioritises receptivity among
Latvia’s Russian-speaking population, but also banks on
the polarisation of the Latvian-speaking population along
political and values lines. Belarus’ approach is similar to
Russia’s, but lacks some of its capabilities. In contrast,
China pursues a low-volume, self-centred elite-driven
strategy that shapes narratives around global legitimacy,
economic interdependence and “win–win” multilateralism,
while engaging in information suppression.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Countering foreign information manipulation in the Baltic sea region |
| Subtitle of host publication | patterns, responses and gaps |
| Place of Publication | Vilnius |
| Publisher | GSSC: Geopolitics and Security Studies Center |
| Pages | 16-22 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Publication status | Published - 2026 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords*
- China
- hybrid
- information
- Latvia
- Russia
- Belarus
Field of Science*
- 5.6 Political science
Publication Type*
- 3.2. Articles or chapters in other proceedings other than those included in 3.1., with an ISBN or ISSN code
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