Non-oligarchic Public Voice in Kazakhstan from Below, 2011–2022

How did the marginalisation of oligarchic opposition affect regime-opposition dynamics and regime outcomes in Kazakhstan? This chapter analyses how in the absence of the feedback signal that oligarchic opposition agency had provided, the Nazarbayev regime was left exposed to spontaneous, grassroots opposition voice. The chapter first provides an overarching characterisation of non-institutional, non-oligarchic opposition in Kazakhstan, before then examining four ‘shocks’ to the regime which occurred between 2011 and 2022. This includes the Zhanaozen violence of 2011, the land protests of 2016, the election protests of 2019 and the violence of ‘bloody January’ in 2022. In each case, the heterogenous nature and varied claims held by opposition were difficult to manage and the regime’s response was largely scattergun. Sanctions were aimed at various groups who often had little involvement, while institutional adaptation was undertaken to give the impression of reform. Such efforts on the part of the regime ultimately failed to address the material and ideational concerns which had given rise to a persistent use of non-oligarchic public voice. The events of 2022 did see part of the regime (the influence of Nazarbayev) collapse because of the long-term 30-year cycle of regime-opposition dynamics driven by opposition agency.