Abstract
Phenomenological philosophy concentrates on experience and how we experience
things, and as such it could be described as a philosophy of subjectivity. However, it does not
mean that it avoids questions about objectivity, that is the world around us as it is itself. Rather
it claims that everything we consider to be objectively existing is given exclusively through and
consequently as a part of subjectivity. Therefore, subjectivity is an integral aspect of every kind
of objectivity. And there is no wonder that the question about the experiencing subject or the I
itself that experiences itself and the world around it lies at the heart of phenomenology. What
it this I, and how, phenomenologically viewed, this subjectivity should be understood?
Answering this question this chapter shows that within phenomenology it is impossible to speak about one way in which the I is revealed in experience. To be more precise, based on Husserl’s philosophical ideas, this chapter sets the goal to expound three different ways in which the I experience myself: I can experience myself (1) as embodied person, (2) as a human being, and (3) as the transcendental subjectivity. But, as will be revealed, the way I experience myself depends on the attitude I take toward what I experience. Therefore, the first part of the chapter will be dedicated to the question what the term ‘attitude’ means in the context of Husserl’s phenomenology. The second part of the chapter then will deal with the personalistic attitude in which I experience myself as an embodied person. The third part will look into the naturalistic attitude which presents myself as a human being, and, lastly, the fourth part will address the phenomenological or transcendental attitude within which I am revealed as the transcendental subjectivity
things, and as such it could be described as a philosophy of subjectivity. However, it does not
mean that it avoids questions about objectivity, that is the world around us as it is itself. Rather
it claims that everything we consider to be objectively existing is given exclusively through and
consequently as a part of subjectivity. Therefore, subjectivity is an integral aspect of every kind
of objectivity. And there is no wonder that the question about the experiencing subject or the I
itself that experiences itself and the world around it lies at the heart of phenomenology. What
it this I, and how, phenomenologically viewed, this subjectivity should be understood?
Answering this question this chapter shows that within phenomenology it is impossible to speak about one way in which the I is revealed in experience. To be more precise, based on Husserl’s philosophical ideas, this chapter sets the goal to expound three different ways in which the I experience myself: I can experience myself (1) as embodied person, (2) as a human being, and (3) as the transcendental subjectivity. But, as will be revealed, the way I experience myself depends on the attitude I take toward what I experience. Therefore, the first part of the chapter will be dedicated to the question what the term ‘attitude’ means in the context of Husserl’s phenomenology. The second part of the chapter then will deal with the personalistic attitude in which I experience myself as an embodied person. The third part will look into the naturalistic attitude which presents myself as a human being, and, lastly, the fourth part will address the phenomenological or transcendental attitude within which I am revealed as the transcendental subjectivity
Translated title of the contribution | PERSON, MAN AND SUBJECTIVITY IN PHENOMENOLOGY |
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Original language | Latvian |
Title of host publication | Filosofiskā antropoloģija |
Subtitle of host publication | rakstu krājums |
Editors | Vents Sīlis, Vija Sīle |
Place of Publication | Rīga |
Publisher | Rīgas Stradiņa universitāte |
Pages | 75-98 |
Volume | 3 |
ISBN (Print) | 9789934618369 |
Publication status | Published - 2024 |
Field of Science*
- 6.3 Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
- 6.5 Other humanities
Publication Type*
- 3.2. Articles or chapters in other proceedings other than those included in 3.1., with an ISBN or ISSN code