Subjectivity and human being in the phenomenology of Husserl. Personalistic, naturalistic and phenomenological attitude

The aim of this presentation is to determine what is understood by subjectivity or I and how it is conceptually related to the concept of human being in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.  To reach the aim Husserl's textual corpus will be conceptually analysed. In the textual corpus of Husserl three different ways of how the experiencing subject (or I) experiences itself: (1) as an embodied person, (2) as a human being, and (3) as the transcendental subjectivity. The way I as the experiencing subject am given to myself depends on the attitude I take up toward myself and the world: (1) personalistic, (2) naturalistic, or (3) phenomenological. In Husserlian phenomenology it is impossible to speak about one way of how I as the experiencing subject am given to myself. Based on Husserl's works, it is possible to discern three ways I myself can be experienced: (1) as an embodied person, (2) as a human being, and (3) as the transcendental subjectivity. The way I as the experiencing subject am given to myself depends on the attitude I take up toward myself and the world: (1) the personalistic, (2) naturalistic, or (3) phenomenological. Taking into account the different ways I can experience myself based on the attitude I take up, the concepts of "I" and "human being" do not completely overlap. I am a human being only in one of several attitudes, i.e., in the naturalistic attitude. Besides, one can be a human being without being an experiencing subject.